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Abstract New meanings can be produced through messages
coming from outside a group (e.g. other cultures, experts and
active minorities), but can also be created by creatively using
social tools one already possesses by belonging to a society. The
two pathways of creativity are related and opposing processes:
the former ‘makes the unfamiliar familiar’, whereas the latter
‘makes the familiar unfamiliar’. Both utilize the existing ‘field of
representations’ as super-ordinate meanings to (re)situate and
therefore understand some object, activity or event.
Representations are schematized in and with a context, through
discourse, in such a way that both the representation and the
context are transformed.
Key Words dynamic schematizing, social creativity, 
social representations
Brady Wagoner
University of Cambridge, UK
Making the Familiar Unfamiliar
The phrase ‘making the unfamiliar familiar’ has a long history in
psychology. It goes back to at least McDougall’s 1908 classic Intro-
duction to Social Psychology (1908/1926), from which Bartlett (1932)
appropriated it to explain the ‘conventionalization’ of images and
stories in perception, imagination and remembering. More recently, the
phrase has become something of a slogan for social representations
researchers through Moscovici’s (2000) emphatic and frequent use of it.
According to these authors, the ‘unfamiliar’ is encountered when: (1)
two different cultures come into contact and elements of both will not
be immediately explicable to the other (Bartlett, 1923); (2) experts
within a society produce new knowledge, which is then communicated
to the public (Moscovici, 1976/2008); and (3) active minorities com-
municate their perspective to the majority (Moscovici, 1980). In all
cases, we have contact of different social groups distinguishable by an
inability to communicate with one another without significant trans-
formation of the message.1
Magioglou (2008) is right to point out that these approaches sideline
the ‘social creative’ already a part of everyday discourse. Through the
tools already available to us as members of society, we generate new
meanings for ourselves and in our mundane interactions with others.
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The process of creative thinking does not require experts, foreign
cultures or minorities for its initiation, though these may be catalysts.
Alternatively, I might simply resituate the familiar in a new context
and in so doing make what was formerly familiar unfamiliar. Under-
standing the structure of this process and how it is related to its
opposite complementary process, making the unfamiliar familiar, is the
focus of this article.
Thinking Culture at Multiple Levels
Objects and events are never isolated from other objects or events
within the field of culture. Boesch (2001) gives the example of a broom,
which is materially derived from wood and horse hair, is designed to
exorcize dirt and pollution, can become a witch’s transport, or stand in
for a horse in child’s play. In particular I want to focus on the general
meaning complexes that surround the concrete objects, activities and
ideas of our everyday lives. These general meanings complexes—such
as honour, pollution, conspiracy, contagion, etc.—have been conceptual-
ized as social representations (Moscovici, 2000).
Thinking is hierarchically organized through social representations,
which guide interpretation at subordinate levels; in other words, social
representations operate on the level of generalized meanings that
organize people’s concrete encounters with the world (Valsiner, 2003).
For example, when sexuality is the dominant representation, oblong
objects become penises, whereas the world interpreted through a
religious representation is filled with God’s creations. A thing becomes
socially meaningful, a part of culture, when it is anchored in ‘the field
of representations’ (Duveen, 2007); the part of the field to which it is
attached—e.g. sexuality or religion—will construct the thing in
particular directions, e.g. a stick as a penis.
Societies make conventional links between representations and
things, which causes inertia within society. In his studies of remember-
ing, Bartlett (1932) found that images easily linkable to representations
always tended toward their conventional form. For example, subjects
having to reproduce an odd squiggle when they heard the verbal
stimulus ‘lighting flash’ almost always drew a regular zig-zag, as
lighting is conventionally represented. In this case there is a set
pathway between thing and representation, which is triggered instan-
taneously and proceeds rapidly. These conventional linkages both
disambiguate the world for a group and enable straightforward
communication among its members.
Culture & Psychology 14(4)
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Two Processes of Social Creativity
What happens when the link between thing and representation is not
so immediate and intuitive? Answer: the possibilities of creativity open
up. Such circumstances require additionally mediational work in order
to schematize thing and representation, to create pathways between
the two. This situation occurs when (1) something radically new comes
into the group from outside, so that we must struggle to find a setting
and explanation for this new thing (making the unfamiliar familiar), or
(2) we take a thing out of its conventional setting and explanation and
represent it in a new incongruity context (making the familiar unfamiliar).
In the first, something new enters a group from outside its field of
representations and must be assimilated into the group’s existing
knowledge; while the second recombines things and representations
from within. We will consider first social representations research into
the former, then move to explain how the less understood latter process
might operate.
For the theory of social representations, social creativity is the
ability of groups to elaborate objects coming from outside of what is
known and communicated within their group. Moscovici (1976/2008)
analyses how psychoanalysis—the invention of a little-known
Viennese psychiatrist—is represented within the existing structures of
society. Catholics, for example, find something similar in the concept
to their own practice of confession but are critical of Freud’s dis-
similar ‘image of man’. At the same time they recognize the possible
therapeutic advantages of the new science, so similar to their own
‘talking cure’, while simultaneously feeling the need clearly to
separate the two practices. Furthermore, the distinction between
conscious and unconscious becomes a key component of their repre-
sentation and sexuality drops out altogether. The same process of elab-
oration occurs when two cultures come into contact, as when a story
is passed from one group to another (Bartlett, 1923, 1932) or an activity
like Zen Buddhism is practised in Western societies (Saito, 1996).2
Moscovici’s other complementary research programme is his ‘theory
of innovation’ or ‘minority influence’, whereby the ideas of a minority
group are communicated to a majority group in a persistent and
consistent way to bring about a change of thinking in the majority
group. As with the theory of social representations, the communication
is assimilated into the group’s pre-existing ways of thinking.
Moscovici, Lage and Naffrechoux (1969) comment:
A political party often adopts the ideas or vocabulary of another party or
social movement. Yet citizens continue to vote for this same party, to respond
Wagoner Making the Familiar Unfamiliar
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to this party’s slogans. For example, in France the Gaullist government in
framing its own education program, adopted part of the rhetoric and the
program by student and workers in May 1968. (p. 371)
We see again in this theory how the change of ideas is produced
through something coming into the group from outside. Social repre-
sentations research tends to focus on the digestion of expert knowledge
systems (e.g. from scientists) or of pieces of foreign culture as the
‘unfamiliar’, whereas the ‘unfamiliar’ in minority influence is the ideas
of a sub-cultural group, which are in opposition to one’s own. What is
left relatively unexplored in this framework is how the minority or
scientist could have developed novel ideas in the first place.
The second form of social creativity comes from the group itself.
Here, the ‘unfamiliar’ occurs when we intentionally use a strange
representation to understand something. Magioglou (2008) talks about
social creativity as bringing together elements normally kept apart. It
will be fruitful to compare this idea to Burke’s (1935) method of
‘perspective by incongruity’. Burke purposively makes unconventional
linkages between representations and things in order to reveal unseen
aspects. He gives the example of taking a lion out of the conventional
cat category and placing it with dogs, with the poetic expression ‘that
big dog, the lion’. In so doing we learn to see lions in a new, more dog-
like fashion. Or we can speak of ‘trained incapacity’, to take another
example from Burke. Normally, we automatically associate training
with enablement. With this discursive act we have highlighted the
limiting or constraining side of training. In short, by making non-
intuitive links between representations and things, a link for which
there is no immediately available pathway, we generate new meanings
for both representation and thing. In the next section, we will further
consider the process of unfamiliarizing the familiar and its relationship
to its opposite, in the context of the theory of dynamic schematizing.
Dynamic Schematization: Creating Pathways between
Representation and Context
Werner and Kaplan, in their classic book Symbol Formation (1963),
explain how symbols are generated out of a dynamic schematizing
process between object and symbolic vehicle. For our purposes we can
understand the object as the generalized meaning complex and the
symbolic vehicle as the concrete context in which it becomes objectified,
though it should be noted that this is an extension of Werner and
Kaplan’s concepts. According to their theory, any generalized meaning
can be represented in and with any context or thing, though, as we
Culture & Psychology 14(4)
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have seen above, conventional relationships are established in society
between certain meanings, for example a flag for a nation. Social repre-
sentations reduce ambiguity and constrain the movement to the future
by creating an orientation toward particular patterns of experience and
away from others (Valsiner, 2003). We conventionally use the general
meaning WAR to schematize our experience of the activity ARGUMENT.
We say, ‘Your claims are indefensible’, ‘His criticisms were right on
target’, and ‘he shot down all of my arguments’ (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980,
p. 5). A very different meaning would be produced through the uncon-
ventional metaphor ARGUMENT IS DANCE. But in both cases, a general-
ized meaning from one activity is used to understand another
concretely.
It should be pointed out that the relationship is not so easily
reversed. We do not use the complex ARGUMENT to understand the
concrete activity WAR. In the metaphor ARGUMENT IS WAR, war acts as
the super-ordinate meaning, whereas in WAR IS ARGUMENT, argument
has that role. In Cambridge, I frequently describe to others the roads
running through the centre of town as SERPENTINE STREETS. It is not diffi-
cult for my interlocutors to imagine the S-curved shape of a slithering
snake as the form of the road. This pathway of schematizing is done
by all. However, what if I were to describe the snake that crawled
across my path as ‘street-like’? What sense would be made of it? My
guess is that we would find a much greater diversity in pathways: one
interlocutor might visualize the pattern on the snake’s back as being
similar to the yellow marks on a road, while another might assume I
was referring to snake’s rather straight shape and/or motion. Certain
complexes are more readily linked together than others and the
pathways between them are firmly established. We frequently use
snakes to describe S shapes and rarely use ‘road’ as a metaphorical
device in this same context of expression.
Democracy has been a powerful social representation in the last
hundred years. It was used in radically different ways by Soviet and
Western powers to justify their system of government against other
alternatives. Magioglou (2008), however, is not concerned with expert
influences on innovation, in this case the rhetorical devices utilized by
the political elite; instead she explores how normal people in their
everyday lives bring representations into new contexts, which might
be seen as incongruent from the standpoint of experts, to generate new
meanings.
The representation DEMOCRACY has historically been limited to the
political context. However, when Magioglou’s interviewee Yiannis
brings this generalized complex into the context of INTERPERSONAL
Wagoner Making the Familiar Unfamiliar
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RELATIONSHIPS (family, friends, school, the army, etc.), DEMOCRACY
becomes a kind of personality trait. A ‘democratic person’ is one ‘who
takes into consideration his significant others’ opinion before doing
something important’ (Magioglou, 2008, p. [26file]). Heleni,
Magioglou’s other case study, schematizes DEMOCRACY to the context of
CHRISTIAN SPIRITUALITY. DEMOCRACY becomes an ideal that individuals
can aspire to, something to have personal faith in, and not something
that can be accessed en masse. We see in both these examples dynamic
schematizing whereby novel aspects of both context and represen-
tation are revealed by bring together fields normally kept apart.
Conclusion
To be known, a thing has to be situated within the field of represen-
tations. Society provides us with conventional linkages between
representations and things, which are triggered instantaneously and
proceed rapidly along a set pathway when experiencing. With the
creative use of discourse we can, however, create novel linkages
between things and representations, in order to generate new perspec-
tives and meanings on that thing and elaborate the representation.
Novel combinations of things and representations disable automatic
pathways in experiencing, forcing us to additional mediational work
in order to schematize the two together.
When something comes from outside the field of representations, as
when a scientific theory is assimilated by the public, a similar process
is at work, forging novel linkages between representations and things.
However, with persistent use, novel linkages can become conventional.
For example, Moscovici (1976/2008) found that in time ‘psycho-
analysis’, as represented by Communists, began to evoke a whole
complex of ready-made meanings—such as bourgeois, American,
capitalist, individualist—which at first had to be made explicitly.
The power of representation and of language to create new meanings
is infinite, yet at the same time we are constrained by these very same
tools. The interplay between constraint (conventional automatic
linkages) and creativity (making new linkages out of existing con-
ventions) in everyday thinking opens up a new and exciting field of
research, to which Magioglou (2008) is a thoughtful contributor.
Notes
1. Jodelet’s Madness and Social Representations (1989/1991), one of the classic
texts within the theory, does set out a slightly different research agenda.
Culture & Psychology 14(4)
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Here the mad, who live among villagers, are the ‘unfamiliar’ requiring
explanation.
2. More recent work in social representations theory has concentrated greater
attention on everyday discourse and lay thinking as such (see Marková,
2003; Wagner & Hayes, 2005).
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